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Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation: the Portuguese Local Finances Law

Abstract
Biodiversity loss is a serious global environmental problem. Economic instruments in biodiversity policies can contribute towards reconciling the conservation costs encountered at local level with the benefits of biodiversity conservation at higher levels of governance, from regional and national levels up to the global level. This paper outlines the theoretical foundations of fiscal transfers in conservation policies and also offers a concise account of existing international experience and future prospects. The recently amended Portuguese Local Finances Law (LFL) of 2007, with its groundbreaking new article on the promotion of local sustainability, is analysed in terms of the significance of fiscal transfers for municipal budgets. It is compared with its predecessor law, highlighting changes in fiscal revenues for selected municipalities in the country in relation to their designated protected areas. The ana gical fiscal transfers can be significant for those lysis shows that these ecolo 1
Introduction
Biodiversity loss associated with global environmental change is a serious phenomenon which has been addressed extensively over the past ten years. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005a) established a new framework in which the concept of ecosystem services is used to analyse and understand the effects of environmental change on ecosystems and human well-being. Building on the MA and other recent studies, the international TEEB initiative 1 extended its focus to address specifically the economics and policies related to conserving biodiversity and maintaining ecosystem services (TEEB, 2010 , TEEB, 2011 . The economic values of biodiversity, ecosystems and their services need to find their way into societal decision making if they are to help reduce and halt the loss of biodiversity. Since "global environmental change is best understood as processes that are manifest in localities, but with causes and consequences at multiple spatial, temporal and socio-political scales" (Adger et al., 2005) , reconciling the global and local dimensions of biodiversity assessments (including related conservation costs and benefits) presents an opportunity for progress in integrating biodiversity conservation and human well-being (Faith, 2005) . Where appropriate, the use of economic instruments in biodiversity policies are a powerful means of reconciling the conservation costs encountered at local level with the benefits of biodiversity conservation at higher levels of governance, from regional and national levels up to the global level (Perrings and Gadgil, 2003; TEEB, 2011; Ring et al., 2010) .
Where economic instruments have been used in conservation policies, they have thus far focused largely on land users and thus on private local actors and their conservation costs. Conservation subsidies, agri-environmental prog , payments for environmental services have been 1 TEEB -The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
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Theoretical background
Fiscal transfer schemes redistribute public revenues from national and regional governments to local governments. They serve several purposes. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers provide decentralised governments with the financial resources needed to discharge their local public functions while also helping to reduce fiscal imbalances across decentralised governments (Boadway and Shah, 2007) . They also compensate local governments for expenses they implemented and studied in many countries, although much remains to be done (e.g., OECD, 1999; Wunder et al., 2008; TEEB, 2011 ). Yet municipal and district governments -the local public actors -also run into management and opportunity costs as a result of conservation policies. These costs are usually incurred in relation to protected areas, one of the essential regulatory instruments of biodiversity conservation (MA, 2005b; TEEB, 2011) . In particular, the existence of large protected areas and those associated with significant landuse restrictions (such as national parks or Natura 2000 sites as defined by the EU Habitats Directive) may lead to a loss of development opportunities and therefore to a reduction in municipal budgets through forgone local taxes. Thus opposition to establishing new protected areas is encountered worldwide, as local communities often perceive them to be an obstacle to development (e.g. Stoll-Kleemann, 2001 ). Local communities comprise both private and public local actors, each requiring appropriate instruments to address the specific conservation costs incurred by them. With regard to local governments, intergovernmental fiscal transfers have been identified as a suitable instrument to internalise the spillover benefits (positive spatial externalities) associated with biodiversity conservation (SRU, 1996; Ring, 2002; Köllner et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a) .
In this paper, we present the theoretical foundations of fiscal transfers in the context of conservation policies, followed by a concise account of existing international experience and future prospects. As the first Member State to recognise protected areas as an indicator for the redistribution of public revenues through fiscal transfers from national to local governmental level, Portugal is a pioneer within the European Union. We describe the recently amended Portuguese Local Finances Law (LFL) of 2007, focusing in particular on its groundbreaking new article promoting local sustainability. We then analyse this new Local Finances Law and compare it with its predecessor, highlighting changes in fiscal revenues for selected municipalities in the country in relation to their designated protected areas.
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Intergovernmental fisca 2.1 l transfers for biodiversity conservation 4 incur when providing spillover benefits to areas beyond their boundaries, for example for schools, theatres and hospitals. Fiscal transfer schemes have evolved over many years. They can be highly sophisticated and are generally the result of a (continuous) bargaining process among public actors at different levels of government over adequate financial resources. Usually, social and economic indicators are used to redistribute public revenues to lower levels of government, reflecting the acknowledged relevance of social and economic public functions. The number of inhabitants represents the most widely used indicator. Some countries also use GDP-related figures or the area of a jurisdiction as factors that influence the average provisioning costs of public goods and services.
By contrast, there is still some way to go before ecological public functions and indicators are recognised more widely within fiscal transfer systemsdespite the fact that such components are a key prerequisite for sustainable development in a multi-level governance context (Ring, 2002) . Although ecological public functions related to infrastructure and end-of-pipe issues may be considered 2 , biodiversity conservation in particular tends to be widely neglected. Municipal budgets generally tend to lose out in relation to conservation activities and associated land-use restrictions, whereas they tend to grow with development activities which generate local land, business and income taxes. For this reason, municipalities are more interested in attracting new businesses or inhabitants rather than preserving nature and its services. Whereas the designation of protected areas is usually decided upon at higher levels of government, it is the local level which bears the costs of losing these areas for other income-generating or social developments (Perrings and Gadgil, 2003; Ring, 2008a) . Whenever such a mismatch occurs between the costs and benefits of providing public goods, local actors have no incentive to engage in these activities. In terms of biodiversity conservation, paper parks and land degradation may be a consequence of this imbalance between local costs and spillover conservation benefits .
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be an effective instrument in supporting the local provision of ecological goods and services with spillover benefits if ecological indicators are used for redistributing finances from central to local levels (Ring, 2002; Köllner et al., 2002; May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a, b (Grieg-Gran, 2000; May et al., 2002; Loureiro, 2008; Ring, 2008a) . Both countries use the size of protected areas (sometimes coupled with their quality) as an easily available biodiversity indicator for the distribution of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to local governments. In this section, we offer a brief account of the Brazilian experience and of developments in other countries. After this, we present the Portuguese case in greater detail.
The Brazilian ICMS tax 3 is similar to the value-added tax in other countries (Grieg-Gran, 2000; May et al., 2002) and constitutes an important source of public revenue at state level. As of 2010, 14 out of 26 states have introduced ecological indicators to redistribute part of this tax from the state level back to local governments (TNC, 2010) . Due to the system of fiscal federalism in Brazil, different indicators are used by the various states, but all have one ecological indicator in common, based on conservation units. Conservation units represent designated protected areas for biodiversity conservation or restricted sustainable use areas, weighted by the degree of land-use restriction associated with the relevant conservation area category. Originally, the ecological ICMS was introduced as a means to compensate local governments for land-use restrictions imposed in relation to protected areas, but over the years it has also become an incentive to designate new protected areas (May et al., 2002) .
The states of Paraná and Minas Gerais, which introduced the ecological ICMS in 1992 and 1996 respectively, have the longest standing experience with this instrument. By the year 2000, public and private protected areas in Paraná had increased by a total of 1,052,752 hectares (ha), or 165%. In Minas Gerais, a comparable increase of 1,005,214 ha, or 62% of protected areas, was witnessed between the introduction of the ICMS Ecológico and the year 2000 (May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a) . Ecological fiscal transfers have proved particularly successful for municipalities with large protected areas, because the indicator used relates the quantity of protected areas within municipal boundaries to the tota In this way, a municipality with 100% land-use 6
Fiscal transfers as part of a wid r policy mix Ecological fiscal transfers have existed for almost twenty years in Brazil, developing into an incentive for municipalities to engage in the management of existing protected areas and to designate or support new ones (May et al., 2002; Loureiro, 2008; Ring, 2008a) . This exemplifies the fact that protected area regulations on their own are not enough. Instead, a combination of regulation and economic instruments capable of offsetting the costs associated with protected areas is required; such a linkage creates synergies and enables the restrictions due to protected areas within its territory benefits more than one which has land-use restrictions on only 20% of its territory. In addition to the quantity of protected areas, a few states also include the quality of protected areas in the calculation of ecological fiscal transfers to the municipalities. However, Paraná is the only state to have successfully implemented a quality indicator early on, promoting the monitoring and active management of existing protected areas. As a result, there has been not only a quantitative but also a qualitative increase in relation to the protected areas (Loureiro, 2002 (Loureiro, , 2008 .
In other countries, conservation-based indicators have been recommended by environmental expert commissions (e.g. in Germany: SRU, 1996) or proposed as an option in the scholarly literature, in some cases accompanied by modelled results of the potential fiscal consequences for local governments (for Switzerland: Köllner et al., 2002; for Germany: Ring, 2002; Perner and Thöne, 2005; Ring 2008b ; for India: Kumar and Managi, 2009; for Indonesia: Irawan and Tacconi, 2009; Ring et al., 2010; Mumbunan et al., 2010) . In Norway, the first official documents have appeared in which consideration is given to exploring fiscal instruments for biodiversity conservation (Norwegian Department of Fin ance, 2009).
In the near future, ecological fiscal transfers may also play a role in the implementation of international programmes on a nationwide scale, linking climate mitigation with biodiversity conservation policies . In Indonesia, for example, many local governments perceive forest exploitation and land-use change to be among the easiest ways to generate local public revenues (Barr et al., 2006) , because local budgets benefit from logging activities within municipal boundaries. Forest conservation, by contrast, does not add to the budget. Therefore, REDD+ initiatives (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) will need to take into account fiscal transfer schemes to the local level as one important means of channelling international payments for biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation from the national down to lower levels of government, thereby contributing to the successful national implementation of international REDD+ schemes (Irawan and Tacconi, 2009; Ring et al., 2010) .
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spillover benefits generated to be internalised, at least to some extent. The increased supply of biodiversity conservation in the relevant Brazilian states through more and better managed protected areas could only feasibly be achieved at higher social cost by means of protected area regulations alone . Ecological fiscal transfers have the potential to turn the oftencountered local opposition towards these areas into active support.
When it comes to considering a comprehensive policy mix for biodiversity conservation, there is a need to acknowledge the additional costs generated by biodiversity conservation for both public and private local actors. Brazil has so far focused its attention on local governments. The situation in Europe is just the opposite. Here, a number of state-led, public-private and private programmes exist to compensate landowners and businesses -predominantly private actors -for the extra costs they incur when providing ecological goods and services (Ring, 2008a) . However, when the Natura 2000 network was established in the context of the European Union's Habitats Directive, substantial local opposition also came from local governments, not just from landowners. With the recent amendment of its Local Finances Law, Portugal has become the first European Member State to recognise Natura 2000 sites and other nationally protected areas as indicators for the redistribution of public revenues from central to local governments. This represents an innovative step forward in the European biodiversity policy landscape, one which will hopefully be followed by other countries.
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Portuguese Local F
inances Law
General description
In January 2007 a new scheme of fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation was introduced in Portugal with the approval of a revised Local Finances Law (LFL -Law 2/2007, 15th January). The Local Finances Law establishes the general principles and rules for the transfer of funds from the state (national government) to the local level (municipalities) in Portugal. These intergovernmental fiscal transfers account for an average of around 60% of the budgets of Portuguese municipalities (the remainder is made up of local taxes on property and vehicles, tariffs and other sources of municipal revenue). In some municipalities with a low population density and a low level of economic activity, the w r se flo s may represent up to 97% of total evenue. This law specifies three different funds through which the transfers from national to local level are disbursed: 8 (see Table 1 -A variable amount corresponding to up to 5% of the IRS (personal income ta living in the municipality. x) collected from individuals 3.2 Nature conservation in LFL A newly introduced Article 6 of LFL, dedicated to the promotion of local sustainability, establishes that 'the financial regime of municipalities shall contribute to the promotion of economic development, environmental protection and social welfare'. This general objective is supported by several mechanisms, including positive discrimination for those municipalities with land designated as Natura 2000 network or other national protected areas. In this way, conservation areas affect the allocation of funds from the General Municipal Fund (FGM -Fundo Geral Municipal) and this mechanism effectively constitutes an ecological fiscal transfer.
The FGM, in which positive ecological discrimination is introduced, is equal to 50% of the Financial Equilibrium Fund (FEF); the remaining 50% of the FEF is allocated to the Municipal Cohesion Fund (FCM), whose aim is to balance out levels of development and opportunities among municipalities. FGM moneys are allo ng criteria: cated to municipalities according to the followi -e 5% is distributed qually to all municipalities; -65% is allocated as a function of population (weighted in order to benefit mainly municipalities with a lower population density 4 ) and of the average number of stays in hotels and on campsites;
-25% is allocated in proportion to the area, weighted by elevation levels, and 5% in proportion to land designated as Natura 2000 or other protected areas list of areas included in the Portuguese system of 4 Mar n are defined as follows: ginal weighting factors for populatio -first 5,000 inhabitants: 3 -from 5,001 to 10,000 inhabitants: 1 -from 10,101 to 20,000 inhabitants: 0.25 s: 0.5 -from 20,101 to 40,000 inhabitant -from 40,101 to 80,000 inhabitants: 0.75 -more than 80,000 inhabitants: 1 Population from the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira is weighted by a factor of 1.3. 9 designated conservation areas) in municipalities with less than 70% of their territory under Natura 2000 or protected areas regimes; or -20% is allocated in proportion to the area, weighted by elevation levels, and 10% in proportion to land designated as Natura 2000 or other protected areas in municipalities with more than 70% of their territory under Natura 2000 or protected areas regimes. Within each of the three territorial units, the allocation of FGM among municipalities was conducted according to the following criteria:
-40% as a function of population and of the average number of stays in hotels and on campsites;
-5% in proportion to the population aged under 15; -y elevation levels; 30% in proportion to land area, weighted b -15% according to the number of parishes;
-10% as a function of the IRS (personal income tax) collected from individuals living in the municipality.
The most significant changes contained in the revised law compared to the former regime are as follows: The rules for allocating the Municipal Cohesion Fund have been altered, leading to a system of horizontal fiscal equalisation between municipalities. With the new law, some well-off municipalities may be net contributors to this fund while others are beneficiaries; the previous law provided only for vertical transfers for municipalities with fiscal capacities below the national average. In addition, the marginal weighting of population in the allocation of FGM is a novel element of the new law, aimed at benefiting less densely populated municipalities. From the point of view of biodiversity conservation, however, the most significant change is the implementation of the ecological fiscal transfer scheme in the context of the FGM. This scheme provides for the compensation of municipalities whose economic development options have been limited by the land-use constraints imposed as a result of the designation of protected areas or Natura 2000 sites. It thus provides a financial incentive to local authorities, creating a mind-set more favourably disposed towards biodiversity conservation. In the following section we present an analysis of the implications of the new scheme for a selected sample of municipalities in Portugal, highlighting the fiscal impacts of the introduction of the ecological fiscal transfer scheme.
Result
s and discussion
Scope
Portugal is divided into 18 districts and two autonomous regions, the Azores and Madeira archipelagos. The districts and autonomous regions are subdivided into 308 municipalities (278 on the mainland and 30 on the Azores and Madeira). In this study a representative sample of 26 municipalities is used to assess the effects of the ecological fiscal transfer scheme. This sample includes:
-A balanced number of municipalities with both more and less than 70% of their total area covered by conservation status (national protected areas and Natura 2000), in order to assess the impact of the scheme on the two groups e of municipalities differ ntiated in the law for purposes of allocating the FGM; -A wide range of municipalities in terms of land area and population, the latter eflecting the ranges introduced by the new LFL for the allocation of the FGM. r Table 2 summarises the main characteristics of the municipalities included in the sample for the year 2008. In some of the municipalities a very high proportion of land area is subject to ecological constraints, such as Barrancos or Campo Maior, 99.9% of whose territory is under conservation status. Figure 2 ). Other municipal revenues come from different sources, such as direct taxes (e.g. property taxesImposto Municipal sobre Imóveis (IMI)) or indirect taxes/tariffs (e.g. water and sanitation), but overall, fiscal transfers accounted for 60% of total municipal revenue in Portugal in 2008, and this figure had not changed much over the preceding years. Between 2004 and 2008 the average level of fiscal transfers as a proportion of total municipal revenue has always been more than 52%, revealing that the municipalities depend to a significant extent on national funding. The introduction of the new LFL in 2007 did not significantly change the total value of fiscal transfers, despite the changed criteria introduced to calculate them. However, the allocation of the total transfers to the different funds did change, and this is revealed in the variation in the share of FGM and FCM (Figure 2 , on the r ) ight .
The level of fiscal transfers as a proportion of municipal revenue differs significantly between the municipalities in the selected sample (Table 3) . In 2008, for example, it varied from 25% in Lisbon to 97% in Barrancos. In 7 of the To assess the effects of implementing the new LFL in the selected municipalities, the real values of the 2008 fiscal transfers were compared to the estimated fiscal transfers for the same year applying the old LFL criteria (including the criteria for calculating the total value for 2008) and the criteria for allocation among the municipalities (Table 4 ). This analysis makes it possible to identify which municipalities win and which ones lose out as a result of the changes in the law. Total fiscal transfers in 2008 calculated according to the new LFL amounted to 2,406,532,953 euros. When the criteria from the old LFL are applied, the estimated total amount for 2008 is 2,538,311,667 euros. So total fiscal transfers would be 5.5% higher if the old law was still applied, showing that the changes introduced by the new LFL reduced the total amount transferred from the national to the local level. The value for the new LFL includes the Social Municipal Fund (FSM), which was created to compensate municipalities for new roles and responsibilities transferred from central government by the new law. If FSM is excluded then the difference compared with the old law is even larger.
All the municipalities included in the sample lose out as a result of the changes in the law. However, this difference is more significant for some municipalities than for others. For example, under the new LFL, Vila do Bispo and Aljezur lose 13.1%, while Peso da Régua loses only 3.0%. One unexpected outcome is that municipalities belonging to the group with more than 70% of land with conservation status lose more with the new law on average (7.9%) 15 than municipalities belonging to the other group (5.6%). It should be noted, however, that both groups of sampled municipalities experience a greater reduction in fiscal transfers in percentage terms than the total national average (5.5%).
In order to eliminate the effect associated with the differences in the amount of total fiscal transfers (resulting from the different criteria assumed in the old and new laws to calculate these figures), an alternative scenario was developed which assumed an equal total amount in the application of both laws (the real value for 2008 resulting from the new law) ( Table 5 ). This approach makes it possible to separate the effects resulting from differences in the allocation criteria for the funds.
A comparison of this new scenario for the old law with the new LFL (Table 5) shows that only 62% of municipalities lose out under the new law (16 out of 26), whereas in the previous case they were all losers (Table 4 ). The losses are also less significant (5.9% at most in the case of Vila do Bispo and Aljezur). Ten municipalities win with the new LFL funds allocation criteria, eight of them belo e nging to th group with less than 70% conservation status area.
This result indicates that the introduction of the ecological component was not sufficient to counterbalance other effects and provide a greater incentive to those municipalities with a larger proportion of protected areas. Future research is needed to understand in depth the influence of the different crossover effects resulting from the various changes in the allocation criteria.
Comparison of 2008 FGM with and without the ecological component
In this section, we analyse in more detail the ecological component introduced with the new LFL. As previously described, the ecological criterion is one of the criteria listed for the allocation of the General Municipal Fund (FGM). As described above, the FGM is allocated to municipalities mainly according to population, area (weighted by elevation levels) and land area designated as Natura 2000 or other national protected areas. A new scenario was developed to illustrate the situation that arises when the criterion "area" does not include the proportion of the municipality's land that has conservation status. Thus it is assumed that 30% of the FGM is assigned to each municipality according to area (weighted by elevation levels). The remaining 70% of the FGM continues to be allocated without any changes (5% equally and 65% according to the "population"), and the total value of the Fund is also not changed. This simulation isolates the effect achieved by introducing the ecological criterion in Portuguese fiscal transfers.
The results presented in Table 6 show that all municipalities with more than 70% of their territory under Natura 2000 or protected areas regimes would lose out if the new LFL was applied without the ecological criterion. In the group of municipalities with less than 70% of their territory under Natura 2000 or other protected areas regimes, there are 9 winners and 6 losers, but those that lose out have a relative loss lower than that for the other group of municipalities. In the first group the average loss is -15.2%, while in the second group the average loss is only -1.4%. Figure 3 shows that the spatial distribution of the municipalities in the sample has no significant effect. When the ecological component is removed, losing municipalities are found in both coastal and inland districts. Certain specific unit indicators were calculated in order to better understand the significance of the ecological component for the municipalities. Table 7 presents the share of this component in municipalities' total revenues and fiscal transfers, as well as the values per unit of area (hectare) and population (inhabitant). the municipalities in the group with more than 70% of designated area (between 4% and 38%) and much higher on average than in the other group (less than 8%). At either extreme along this scale are Castro Verde, where the ecological component is 38% of total fiscal transfers and 34% of total municipal revenue, and Lisbon, Almeirim and Aguiar da Beira, where the ecological component is zero.
The distribution of funds through the ecological transfer scheme per inhabitant varies significantly in the municipalities of the sample, even between municipalities belonging to the same group. Even though the ecological component is not very powerful overall, it is still significant for the inhabitants of some municipalities with problematic socio-economic contexts and whose land is almost completely under conservation status, as in the case of Barrancos.
Conclusion
The new Portuguese LFL introduces a new scheme whose aim is to compensate municipalities for land-use constraints imposed by the designation of protected areas or Natura 2000 sites, thus providing a financial incentive to local authorities, creating a mind-set more favourably disposed towards biodiversity conservation. This objective is in line with theoretical work arguing that intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be an effective instrument in supporting the local provision of ecological goods and services with spillover benefits if ecological indicators are used to redistribute finances from central to local levels (Ring, 2002; Köllner et al., 2002; May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a, b) . The analysis presented above has shown that these ecological fiscal transfers can be significant for some municipalities in which the amount of land granted con v ser ation status constitutes a large part of their overall territory.
By simultaneously introducing a significant number of changes in the Portuguese intergovernmental fiscal transfer scheme, however, the ecological component of the new LFL is difficult to grasp by the stakeholders affected (namely municipal authorities) due to the presence of many crossover effects. The overall reduction in the global value of fiscal transfers (when compared with the amounts that would have been transferred if the law had not been changed), combined with these crossover effects, has contributed to lessening the financial incentive offered to municipalities. The significance of the ecological fiscal transfer for municipalities with a high proportion of conservation areas is clear, however, as shown in the scenario in which the new LFL is simulated without the ecological component.
22
The current exercise has shown that several options exist for improving the Portuguese LFL in order to strengthen the incentive to maintain existing conservation areas and to create new ones. The introduction of a "quality" criterion for the allocation of ecological fiscal transfers is an approach which complements the existing criteria, providing an additional incentive at the level f conservation management. o
